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Abstract 
[Excerpt] This article explains the basic elements of the cement workers' experience with in-plant 
strategies. Those of us who have witnessed and have been involved in this struggle think other unionists 
should consider this strategy as a possible option in the difficult kinds of situations many unions face 
today. 
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It's 6:30 in the morning as a diverse group of pickets circle the 
entrance of a cement plant. Cement workers, their spouses and 
children, retirees from the plant and other supporters carry signs 
proclaiming contract demands. Inside the administration building, 
panicky phone calls are made to top management, "They've finally 
gone on strike." 
But at 6:50 the cement workers bid good morning to their 
families and supporters, line-up and march into the plant singing 
Solidarity Forever. 
As this scene shows, the cement workers' effort to win a contract 
and maintain an industry standard is not a typical labor struggle. 
More than 8,000 of them in some 50 cement plants throughout 
the country have been without a contract since May 1, 1984. In 
the face of companies' preparations for an all-out union-busting 
campaign, the cement workers—represented by the International 
Brotherhood of Boilermakers—chose not to strike when their 
contracts expired. Instead, they've engaged in a protracted struggle 
which the Boilermakers call "in-plant strategies." 
Though most cement workers have still not won a contract, they 
• Tom Balanoffis Director of Technical Projects for the International Brotherhood 
of Boilermakers, Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers. 
IN-PLANT STRATEGIES 
have not accepted a bad 
contract either. And, the local 
lodges are stronger and more 
vigorous after more than a year 
of struggle than they were 
when it began. While working 
without a contract goes against 
the best instincts of union 
workers and while in-plant 
strategies involve terrain 
unfamiliar to most unionists, 
this new strategy draws on 
some of the basic roots of 
unionism—solidarity, disci-
plined collective action, and 
unity in determination and 
endurance. 
This article explains the basic 
e lements of the cement 
workers' experience with in-
plant strategies. Those of us 
who have witnessed and have 
been involved in this struggle 
think other unionists should 
consider this strategy as a 
possible option in the difficult 
kinds of situations many unions 
face today. 
THE STRIKE AS A 
MANAGEMENT WEAPON 
A combination of economic 
and political factors has 
rendered the strike ineffective 
in many situations throughout 
the 1980s. Chronically depressed 
conditions in the manufacturing sector and persistently high 
general unemployment have created a large reserve of 
unemployed workers available to replace strikers. These adverse 
economic conditions have transpired in a correspondingly 
unfavorable political climate. Ronald Reagan's prompt action to 
bust PATCO was a clear signal that he intended to use the influence 
of his administration to destroy the basic balance of power that 
has existed between labor and management since the end of 
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Helpers in May of 1983. Announcing 
that his highest priority was to address 
the mounting difficulties the 
Boilermakers were experiencing at the 
bargaining table, Jones assembled a staff 
with expertise in collective bargaining, 
economics and labor law, and charged 
them with developing new strategies for 
halting the erosion of union power. The 
Boilermakers' use of "in-plant 
strategies" is but one of the results of 
this effort. 
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World War II. 
Reagan has advanced his assault on labor by nominating people 
who share his views to the National Labor Relations Board. 
Although Reagan has not attempted to legislatively change the 
NLRA (an effort that would be politically difficult to accomplish), 
many changes have been made through administrative 
interpretations of the Act. By relying on technicalities instead of 
the intent of the law, the Reagan NLRB has successfully denied 
basic rights to unions and workers. 
Complementing this development is the continued expansion 
and growing sophistication of union-busting consultants. The 
initial growth of union-busting firms took place in the 1970s, when 
their efforts were concentrated on thwarting organizing drives at 
non-union workplaces. With an NLRB more sympathetic to their 
goals, union-busters have broadened their activities to include an 
assault against organized workplaces. 
Given the economic and political climate that has existed since 
the late 1970s, it is not difficult to understand why so few strikes 
have been successful in the last five years. This has not been the 
case merely in marginally organized industries; strike-breaking 
has also occurred in highly organized industries with long-term 
collective bargaining relationships. 
In many situations, the strike has actually become the strongest 
weapon in the employers' arsenal. If an employer is intent upon 
busting a union, the strike becomes an integral part of this effort. 
Union-busters commonly advise employers to create strike 
situations as a means toward creating a "union-free environment." 
Typically, employers set on busting their unions will propose 
drastic cuts in wages, fringe benefits and working conditions, and 
while carefully appearing to bargain, they do not. Actually, 
management negotiators are trying to position themselves to 
declare impasse because once impasse is declared the company 
can legally implement its final offer. 
Historically, unions will strike when negotiations reach impasse. 
Union-busters tell employers that unions "instinctively" will strike 
under these circumstances. In such situations, strikers are 
considered "economic strikers" because they are striking over 
"wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment." Under 
the law "economic strikers cannot be fired, but they can be 
permanently replaced." 
The union strike strategy plays right into the hands of employers 
who are determined to bust the union through permanent 
replacements. Strikers are doomed to fail in such situations if 
employers can find scabs with the skills necessary to run their 
IN-PLANT STRATEGIES 
operation. When permanent replacements are introduced, the 
entire nature of a strike changes. Workers are no longer striking 
for better wages and conditions, or to resist concessions, but are 
striking for their jobs. Striking workers are defined as part of the 
bargaining unit for one year from the date a strike begins. After 
a strike has lasted one year, employers petition for decertification; 
as only the replacement employees can vote, the union is usually 
decertified, the strike is broken and the workers have lost their 
jobs. 
Oftentimes employers set on busting the union will commit 
unfair labor practices, such as "surface bargaining'—where a party 
enters into negotiations without a sincere desire to adjust the 
parties' differences and to reach an agreement. If the NLRB finds 
management guilty of this practice, the employer cannot legally 
implement its final offer. More importantly, if an unfair labor 
practice (ULP) exists, workers can strike their employer over the 
practice and be protected from permanent replacement. This is 
one of the basic differences between economic strikers and ULP 
strikers. If workers strike over the charge that their employer 
engaged in surface bargaining and that charge is upheld by the 
NLRB, they cannot be permanently replaced and they are 
compensated for lost wages and benefits from the time 
management implemented its final offer. Unfortunately, under the 
Reagan NLRB, even the most blatant cases of surface bargaining 
are routinely dismissed as "hard bargaining" on the part of 
employers. 
Within this relatively new and discouraging framework, the 
Boilermakers' leadership has sought to develop new strategies in 
collective bargaining. The historic success of strikes was based 
on the economic pressure they brought to bear upon companies, 
and the union understands the critical importance of developing 
other strategies that can create effective economic pressure. While 
the strike weapon has not been abandoned, its use is judiciously 
employed and only after full examination of the facts important 
to determine realistically its likely effectiveness. 
THE IN-PLANT CONCEPT 
The in-plant strategy is based on the premise that organized, 
conscientious and disciplined workers can have a high degree of 
control over a workplace. Through a combination of work practice 
and concerted activity on-the-job, workers can wield great control 
over a company's ability to run a plant the way it would like it 
to run. 
The concept of organized workers in an in-plant strategy has 
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Boilermakers Vice President Richard A. Northrip rallies cement workers 
at Local D-27 in Missouri. 
little to do with the more modern definition of a group of workers 
with a union contract. In fact, the in-plant strategy involves 
working without a contract. In most cases it also involves not 
having the luxury of union security clauses and dues check-off 
provisions. Organized workers engaged in an in-plant strategy have 
an historical link to the 1930s and 1940s when unionized workers 
often worked without contracts. 
The higher the level of understanding workers have of the 
in-plant strategy, the greater the resulting degree of unity and 
organization necessary to implement it. It is important that 
workers understand the basic concepts of the in-plant strategy: 
1) The jobs they have are their jobs and the employer is trying 
to take them away. 2) The employer's actions will, at the very least, 
dramatically reduce the workers' standard of living. 3) Through 
unity and discipline, workers can stay in a plant and legally apply 
pressure from the inside. If workers do not understand who their 
enemy is, what their struggle is all about and the power they hold 
in the plant, the in-plant strategy cannot be successful. 
In the plant, pressure is brought to bear on an employer through 
a combination of concerted activities, utilization of outside 
agencies, and work practices. In conducting any of these activities, 
m 
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it is necessary to maintain a high level of discipline among the 
workforce. Regular and, sometimes, regimented acts of resistance 
to company actions are necessary. 
Under the in-plant strategy, workers protect their rights on the 
job by engaging in concerted activities involving issues of hours, 
wages and other terms and conditions of employment. When 
employees work under an expired contract or a 
company-implemented proposal, grievance and arbitration 
procedures and no-strike clauses are no longer in force. Without 
a contract, these provisions do not exist, as they are legally defined 
as creatures of the contract, and as such these procedures cannot 
be unilaterally implemented. Employers like to have definite rules 
for handling grievances because such rules minimize disruption 
of the production process. This is one of the benefits that 
employers receive by having a contract with their employees. 
When working under employer-implemented proposals—what 
cement workers have come to call "imposals'— workers have to 
rely on their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Section 
8(d) of the NLRA states that an employer must meet at reasonable 
times and reasonable places and "confer in good faith with respect 
to hours, wages and other terms and other conditions of 
employment." The law does not set specific procedures for 
handling disputes other than that employers must meet at 
reasonable times and reasonable places. The union can demand 
to meet at any time of the day or night with a grievance committee 
defined by the union. The union can demand that the company 
meet with a twenty-person committee; if the employer objected, 
then they and the union can negotiate a "reasonable" size 
committee. 
The Union also has to rely on the provisions of the NLRA to 
resolve many disputes. Section 7 of the Act states "Employees shall 
have the r igh t . . . to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and 
protection." This means that under certain circumstances it is a 
legal and protected activity for a group of workers to leave their 
jobs in an orderly manner and to demand that their employer meet 
and resolve disputes. Depending on the dispute, this group of 
workers could expand to include an entire plant. 
When engaging in concerted activities, a common concern is 
that if a dispute is not resolved, employers will demand that 
employees either return to work or leave the plant. If the 
employees leave the plant, the question is then raised of whether 
their activity protects them from replacement. If their dispute 
involved a unilateral change to terms and conditions by the 
\ 
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litions by the 
employer (even if it is off of the company's implemented 
conditions) it would constitute an unfair labor practice. Striking 
employees could not be replaced. If the employees' dispute 
involved an economic issue (as defined by the law), it would be 
an economic strike and the employees could be permanently 
replaced. 
Generally, when unions strike at the expiration of a contract, 
they are required to provide advance notice that there will be an 
orderly shutdown of work. Concerted activities involve no 
advance notice other than workers informing their foreman that 
they are leaving the job to meet and confer with management on 
disputes about terms and conditions of employment. Given the 
circumstances, concerted activities can occur in the middle of a 
night shift or in the middle of filling a rush order from a prime 
customer. 
The lesson that employers are taught is that they have an interest 
NEW VERSES FOR SOLIDARITY 
Solidarity Forever is a familiar song in cement plants around 
the country now. One cement family—Paul and Elizabeth Vance 
and their 14-year-old daughter Lisa, ofBernallio, New Mexico-
composed some new verses to the old song to reflect their 
struggle. 
We have asked for nothing more than that to us is fair. 
Our safety is of no concern, only of production do they care. 
They refuse to meet with us and this is quite unfair. 
Yes the company is unfair. 
(Chorus) 
They want to take away all the rights we have gained. 
They seem to think that we are playing some stupid game. 
We will keep our course until our dignity we have gained. 
For the families we do fight. 
Solidarity forever! 
Solidarity forever! 
Solidarity forever! 
For the union makes us strong. 
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in having a contract. Through a contract, employers can have 
regular and orderly procedures for handling disputes; without a 
contract, unions have to rely on every legal means available to 
protect and promote the interests of their members. 
Another in-plant activity involves the increased utilization of 
federal and state agencies to police conditions in the plant. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration, as the case may be), the Environmental 
Protection Agency and many state agencies regulate safety and 
health conditions in plants. Workers must be educated about their 
rights under the law and taught to recognize hazards in the 
workplace. The union's safety and health activities must be 
expanded from the safety committee to include every worker in 
the plant. Workers must constantly police their workplaces and 
raise all safety and health hazards and violations with 
management. If management fails to correct the problems, the 
union should immediately contact the appropriate federal or state 
agency. Furthermore, workers should question the contents of all 
materials they work with and demand from the company 
documentation that they are not toxic. 
The in-plant strategy over the long haul has a definite impact 
on the psychology of both workers and managers. A successful 
in-plant campaign should build a sense of "movement" and 
"cause" among workers. Managers, however, tend to develop a 
sense of insecurity and impotence in dealing with the in-plant 
activities. This sense is often aggravated by demands from higher 
level management to plant foreman to "take control of the 
situation." 
To implement a successful in-plant campaign requires a dramatic 
restructuring of local unions and the way they function in the 
plant. It is critical to understand that an in-plant strategy will 
require a protracted effort. One or two months of in-plant activities 
will probably not convince an employer that it is in his best interest 
to reach an equitable agreement with his employees. Unions must 
be able to sustain the in-plant program for an extended period of 
time until employers are convinced that the union is neither fleeing 
from nor submitting to their unfair treatment. 
One of the most successful in-plant campaigns was conducted 
by the United Autoworkers at Moog Automotive in St. Louis. It 
took six months before the employer realized it could not 
overcome the in-plant strategy. In that case, the UAW was able 
to turn a concession bargaining situation into an agreement that 
contained major wage and benefit improvements. The Moog case 
demonstrates that the in-plant strategy can be successful, at least 
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on a single plant basis. The International Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers, building on the experience of the Moog workers, 
introduced the in-plant strategy on July 1, 1984, in over 50 cement 
manufacturing plants throughout the country. To my knowledge 
this is the first effort to apply this strategy on a multi-plant, 
multi-company basis. The following details the experience of the 
cement workers in applying the in-plant strategy, known in the 
union as the Solidarity and Unity Program. 
THE CEMENT WORKERS' EXPERIENCE 
The Union and the Industry 
On April 1, 1984, the United Cement, Lime, Gypsum and Allied 
Workers International Union (CLGAW) merged with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, 
Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, becoming a division of the 
Brotherhood. The CLGAW was born in the great campaigns to 
organize industrial workers in the 1930's. An industrial union 
organized by the AFL, the CLGAW's jurisdiction rested primarily 
on organizing workers involved in the production of building 
materials. The major group of organized workers in the CLGAW 
were, and remain, cement manufacturing workers. For most of 
its history, the CLGAW functioned well as a small but strong 
international union, based primarily on the fact that they 
represented 90% of the workers in a basic industry—cement 
manufacturing. 
The merger between CLGAW and the International Brotherhood 
of Boilermakers was the result of a realization by both unions that 
combining resources would yield better services to both unions' 
membership. A major factor prompting this merger (as in most 
union mergers) was a recognition of the impact that adverse 
economic and political conditions have had upon the labor 
movement in recent years. The CLGAW steadily lost membership 
over the last twenty yeas as a result of automation in the 1960s 
and early 1970s and plant closures in the late 1970s. The recession 
of 1981/82 took a heavy toll on CLGAW membership; some cement 
plants did not survive, and few have completely recovered from 
the effect the recession had on the building material industries. 
The collective bargaining history of the Cement Workers is very 
similar to that of many unions in basic industries. Through pattern 
bargaining, similar to bargaining in the auto and rubber industries, 
cement workers were able to achieve contracts that could be 
ranked among the best for industrial workers. Wages and COLA 
i l i : \ 
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provisions have historically kept cement workers' earnings at 
levels comparable to the Autoworkers and Steelworkers. They en-
joyed such long-term fringe benefits as "30-and-out" pension pro-
visions and supplemental unemployment benefits. Cement con-
tracts have also contained strong language to protect workplace 
rights. For example, cement contracts have for years contained 
provisions that allowed workers to refuse work they believe to 
be dangerous. 
The CLGAW was different from other industrial unions in that 
many of the contract gains came about with relatively little 
industrial strife. The last nationwide strike in the cement industry 
was in 1958, when the CLGAW put its basic program of pattern 
bargaining into place. Since that time, there have been a few 
company and regional strikes when companies tried to break from 
the pattern, but the cement workers have never had the number 
or severity of strikes endured by other unions in basic industries. 
While pattern bargaining and an historically small number of 
strikes have benefited the cement worker, they have also benefited 
the cement industry. Standardization of wages freed individual 
cement companies from the threat of other cement companies 
gaining a competitive advantage on labor costs. The rarity of strikes 
also contributed to a cooperative relationship between labor and 
management, which facilitated the resolution of problems of 
mutual concern within the industry. 
The cement industry is one of the few industries which 
underwent major automation changes wi thout major 
confrontations with its labor force. Cement employment declined 
from 37,100 in 1956 to 20,400 in 1983. The impact that automation 
had on the labor force was minimized by strong contract language 
protecting jobs and wage rates. Most of the labor force reductions 
due to the automation were the result of attrition. 
The cement industry is not a labor intensive industry. Depending 
upon the scale of operation, 100 to 150 workers can operate a 
cement plant on a 24-hour continuous basis. Historically 
productivity levels have steadily increased, and thus unit labor 
costs have declined. In 1983, the year before the cement industry 
began its assault on the cement workers union, cement workers 
recorded their highest level of productivity. 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s a number of factors had 
an adverse impact on the cement industry. With 40 to 45% of 
production costs attributable to energy, skyrocketing energy costs 
during the 1970's caused fiscal problems for many cement 
companies. Furthermore, as cement is also a capital-intensive 
industry, the persistently high interest rates of the last 10 years 
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Boilermakers Cement Division Director Henry Bechtholdt (left, in suit 
and tie) marches with cement worker families during Unfair Labor 
Practice strike at General Portland Cement in Houston, Texas. 
placed many cement companies under additional financial 
pressure. Since the late 1970s, these developments were coupled 
with an expanding market of imported cement. Imports have 
tripled since 1982 and now represent 10% of U.S. cement 
consumption. 
To address problems such as these, the CLGAW entered into 
a number of cooperative efforts with the cement industry. The 
union worked with cement companies on alternative energy 
programs; utilized extensive resources in seeking a legislative 
remedy to the cement import problem; and initiated a program 
of cost containment to address the rising cost of medical care. 
Despite such efforts, mounting economic pressures forced major 
changes in the composition of the industry's ownership. Over the 
last ten years, cement has been transformed from an industry 
predominantly owned by companies whose primary business was 
cement manufacturing to an industry controlled by multinational 
(often European) cement companies and large conglomerates with 
diverse business interests. This transformation occurred as the 
capital needs of the industry increased. Most cement companies 
lost millions of dollars in the depressed cement markets of 1982, 
1983 and 1984. Only companies with substantial capital reserves 
could weather the financial pressures of the last few years. 
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The 1984 Negotiations 
On May 1, 1984—just a month after the union merger—all of 
the CLGAW contracts in the domestic cement industry expired. 
The cement workers approached the 1984 cement negotiations 
with the understanding that management would be demanding 
substantial concessions. The union was committed to resisting 
concessions, but in the initial stage of negotiations it became 
evident that the cement industry had higher priorities on their 
agenda than mere contract concessions. 
While demanding major wage and benefit concessions and 
contract language revisions, cement companies throughout the 
country made it clear that they intended to negotiate agreements 
suited to their individual operations. No longer would they follow 
a pattern. The presence of known union busting consultants and 
attorneys gave a clear indication that at least some companies 
intended not just to break pattern bargaining, but also to break 
the union. 
The union selected Lone Star Cement as the company with 
which they would try to reach a pattern settlement. Lone Star, 
the largest producer, participated in most cement markets in the 
country, and it had set the pattern for the previous two contracts. 
Furthermore, while Lone Star had indicated they needed labor 
cost relief, they had not assumed the strong anti-union posture 
adopted by other cement companies. 
The union was able to negotiate a settlement covering 12 Lone 
Star Cement plants. The contract contained wage and COLA 
increases that protected cement workers' earning power, major 
improvements in pensions, and minor improvements in SUB 
benefits. Major concessions were given in insurance and worker 
transfer provisions, and minor concessions were given in holidays 
and vacations. From the union's standpoint, the Lone Star settle-
ment provided some relief to the company while maintaining 
workers' earnings, basic benefits and most work practices. 
In early May 1984, shortly after the Lone Star settlement, the 
cement workers concentrated their efforts on Lehigh Cement, the 
third largest producer. Lehigh, which is owned by a West German 
company, resisted the union's effort to negotiate to the Lone Star 
pattern. They insisted that they needed a two-tier wage scale and 
complete control to subcontract any work they deemed necessary. 
The union relied on its traditional strategy and struck Lehigh 
Cement, shutting down 10 plants across the nation. The union 
had hoped that striking Lehigh Cement while its competitors 
continued to work would bring pressure on the company to settle 
on the pattern. 
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In the few months that followed the Lone Star settlement, the 
union was able to reach a pattern settlement with 10 other cement 
companies, covering a total of 25 plants (Lone Star included). 
At the end of the fourth week of the Lehigh strike, fearing that 
Lehigh was ready to hire permanent replacements, the ten local 
lodges at Lehigh cement made an unconditional offer to return 
to work. This meant they were returning to work under the 
employer's implemented proposal. Later testimony in an NLRB 
proceeding confirmed the union's fear, as Lehigh Cement had in 
fact secretly placed newspaper ads to hire permanent 
replacements. 
By early July 1984, the cement workers found themselves in 
a position where 70% of their cement lodges were working 
without contracts, in several cases under company implemented 
proposals. The strike had become a weapon of employers anxious 
to have their employees strike so they could be replaced. The 
union's alternatives were to strike and risk the possibility of the 
union being destroyed, or to remain in the plants and apply 
continual pressure until the employers agreed to an equitable 
settlement. 
Thus, the cement workers adopted the slightly tested, but 
logically sound, in-plant strategy of the International Brotherhood 
of Boilermakers. The goal of the cement in-plant strategy, which 
is called "the Solidarity and Unity Program," is to resist companies' 
efforts to bust the union, to hold the line on concessions, and most 
importantly, maintain pattern bargaining and standardization of 
labor costs. 
Solidarity and Unity Program 
In implementing the Solidarity and Unity Program, the union 
leadership recognized that major educational efforts were 
necessary to gain membership acceptance. Through a combination 
of group and total membership meetings, representatives 
conducted education programs emphasizing the following points: 
1. The member's job (and its terms and conditions) is 
a key factor in all aspects of his or her life. 
2. The company is unjustly attacking that job and is 
trying to provoke a strike to accomplish this end. 
3. The company feels its attack will be successful 
because the union and its members are weak and 
divided. 
4. Workers have the power through concerted activity 
to protect the terms and conditions of their jobs. The 
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union is what gives them this power and they are 
the union. 
5. Nothing has been given to workers. Our history 
shows us that we've had to fight for whatever gains 
we've made. 
This program redirected the membership's perspectives on their 
struggle and built commitment to the Solidarity and Unity 
Program. Building commitment to fighting the companies' efforts 
was relatively easy in light of the extensive contract concessions 
most companies were proposing. Building commitment to the 
union was also not difficult, as the companies' actions added 
strength to an already strong union membership. Building 
commitment for the in-plant strategy was not as easy for two 
reasons. First, workers' natural instincts when attacked by their 
employer is to strike. An in-plant strategy requires that workers 
not make emotional decisions, but try rather to out-think the 
employer. The second problem is in convincing workers that they 
do have power in the plant. Involvement in their first protected 
concerted activity helped workers overcome feelings of 
powerlessness many initially had about the strategy. 
The cement workers recognized that applying the in-plant 
strategy at the local level required certain departures from normal 
procedure. Lodges were encouraged to expand their traditional 
bargaining committees to include broader representation from the 
plant. The cement workers, as did the autoworkers at Moog, refer 
to these committees as Solidarity Committees. The Solidarity 
Committees are useful in creating a good communication system 
throughout the plant. More importantly, they are a way to build 
and expand local leadership by involving more people in the 
functions of the local and in addressing disputes with the 
employer. The Solidarity Committee is also useful in insulating 
local lodge leaders from employer discrimination. 
As the Solidarity Program becomes effective in a plant, 
management often counters with discharge and discipline of 
members and local leaders. Union representatives made local 
union members aware of this possibility right from the start. Thus, 
when employers did discharge people, the intimidation value was 
limited. Most cement lodges set up "Solidarity Funds" to assist 
discharged members, paying them "victimization benefits." Weekly 
contributions to these funds generally have run between $5 and 
$10 per worker per week. These contributions are voluntary, but 
few cement lodges have less than 100% participation. 
Cement lodges were also encouraged to set up local lodge 
newsletters as a means of increasing communication to the 
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Making Believe 
One cement lodge designated a couple of days to 
play "Let's make believe we have a contract." On 
those days cement workers cooperate 100%, work 
the overtime requested and very graciously greet the 
supervisors. By this action the local can show the 
company how nice it would be to have a contract 
and at the same time let the company know the 
Solidarity and Unity program is in effect and 
working. 
membership. Since the inception of the Solidarity Program, the 
number of local lodge newsletters has doubled, with many lodges 
issuing a two to three page newsletter every week. Rumors at the 
local lodge level can be rampant, and are usually initiated by the 
employer in an effort to create dissension and confusion within 
the local. Newsletters and/or regular leafletting have proven to 
be an effective means of dispelling rumors. 
Building Local Lodge Discipline 
In attempting to organize any group of individuals to act in 
concert, group discipline is key. The union promoted various 
activities that helped build discipline and at the same time 
demonstrated to the employer workers' unity and commitment 
to the union. 
When the Solidarity and Unity Program was first initiated, many 
cement lodges held a series of daily rallies. Thirty minutes before 
a shift began, all workers on that shift would meet for a few words 
of inspiration from the Solidarity Committee and would then 
march into the plant en masse singing Solidarity Forever. At lunch, 
rallies were held in the plant and again would be concluded with 
the workers singing Solidarity Forever. The day would end with 
a short rally in the washhouse and workers leaving the plant en 
masse singing Solidarity Forever. 
The song became an integral part of the Solidarity and Unity 
Program. As many great social and political movements have 
proven, song can provide real inspiration. The words to Solidarity 
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Forever definitely brought inspiration to cement workers—so 
much so that one union family wrote four new verses specific to 
the cement workers' struggle. A hundred seasoned industrial 
workers singing any song constitutes an impressive display of 
determination. It is not uncommon for cement workers to 
spontaneously begin singing or whistling Solidarity Forever on the 
job. Once while workers at a California plant were singing 
Solidarity Forever in the lunch room, customers in an adjoining 
room complimented the employer for promoting an employees' 
choir. 
Resistance to management's efforts to destroy their contract was 
also expressed through workers' attire. Some local lodges had 
Solidarity T-shirts designed which their members would wear 
regularly in the plant; often the entire membership wore their 
T-shirts on the same day. The International also supplied buttons 
and stickers to be worn on hard hats. Slogans on the stickers 
included "We Are Here to Stay," "Lone Star or Better" and an X 
through "Union-Free Environment." 
Local lodges have regularly conducted roadside rallies outside 
the plant gate, frequently followed by informational picketing. 
When the rallies and picketing began before the shift started, the 
employers often believed the workers were striking. Under 
implemented proposals, no-strike provisions do not exist and 
workers can strike at any time. 
Informational picketing proved an excellent means of involving 
the workers' families in the Solidarity and Unity Program. It is 
not uncommon for the spouses and children of cement workers 
to picket the plant while their family members are inside working. 
The informational picket also effectively lets all those who do 
business with the employer (truck drivers, salespeople, and 
customers) know what the company is attempting to do to its 
employees. Many retirees have also joined in informational 
picketing. 
Besides involving families and retirees in their struggle, the 
cement workers have used marches and rallies to involve other 
unions and the local community. Since most cement plants are 
located in rural communities andsmall towns, a union march often 
constitutes a major event and may be the only such activity many 
of these communities have ever experienced. 
The cement workers have expressed their resistance in other 
non-work situations as well. Company Christmas parties, 
safety-award banquets, retirement dinners and other social 
functions have been cancelled because workers routinely boycott 
them. In some instances, local lodges have run counter-parties. 
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One local lodge collected all of the Christmas cards the president 
of the company sent employees and returned them, stating they 
would have a "Merry Christmas" when they had a just and 
equitable contract. At another plant, not a single worker attended 
a fully catered Christmas party set up in the plant and on company 
time. 
Employers have attempted to hold captive audience meetings 
in the plants to "explain their side" to the employees. These 
meetings have been met with resistance. In one cement plant in 
the Southwest, top management personnel from corporate 
headquarters held a meeting to explain the company's 
implemented insurance plan; workers sat through the entire 
meeting but never removed their ear plugs. In another situation, 
workers sat in complete silence, refraining from asking questions 
or making comments. Some local lodges have used these meetings 
to demand resolution of disputes over the implemented 
agreements; management promptly adjourned the meetings. 
There are other acts of resistence to employer implemented 
agreements. 
One company implemented a $90-a-year allowance for safety 
shoes, replacing the contract provision that required the employer 
to provide two pair of safety shoes per year. When the employer 
issued checks to the workers, they were all collected and returned 
2,000 unionists gathered to support cement workers in Victorville, 
California, a town of only 20,000 when there is no union rally. 
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to the plant manager by the local Solidarity Committee. 
In one local lodge not a single member bid on jobs when they 
were posted by the company. 
In several plants the workers took home whatever tools they 
had brought into the plant that were not necessarily required for 
their job. When the tool was needed the company had to provide it. 
On many occasions the repairmen and other skilled tradesmen 
took all their tools with them when they left the plant at the end 
of their shift. Employers typically assumed the workers were going 
to strike. 
These are a few examples of resistance to employers' 
implemented provisions. As the Solidarity and Unity Program 
began to grow in the local lodges, workers became very 
imaginative in developing legal tactics to resist employers' actions. 
Sometimes these union tactics were in response to managers' 
reactions to the Solidarity and Unity Program. 
Grievance Procedures and Concerted Activity 
When implementing final offers, employers often attempt to 
implement grievance procedures. The union has taken the position 
that grievance procedures are "creatures of the contract" and that, 
in the absence of a contract, no set procedures exist for handling 
grievances. Most local lodges have replaced all reference to 
grievances with the term "disputes." Without set procedures, the 
union relies on the NLRA, which provides that employers must 
meet at reasonable times in reasonable places to confer on disputes 
regarding hours, wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Given the scope of changes in the employers' implented 
proposals and the union's commitment to protect its members' 
rights, the cement workers found it necessary to make basic 
changes in the manner in which they addressed disputes in the 
plant. These changes pertained to the manner in which disputes 
are processed and the level of union representation. 
Members were trained to recognize disputes and were 
encouraged to put all disputes into writing. Through this 
procedure, the union hoped to document company abuses while 
at the same time forcing the company to address complaints. This 
process resulted in massive numbers of disputes filed. At one 
plant, over 4,000 disputes were filed in two months, At another, 
there were so many disputes filed that the local union set up a 
desk outside the plant manager's office to accomodate members' 
complaints. 
The size and makeup of the grievance committee—or Solidarity 
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Committee, as commonly referred to in cement plants—depends 
on the nature of the dispute. If the dispute involved an issue in 
the pack house, the committee would be composed primarily of 
workers from that department. However, if the dispute involved 
shift work the committee might be made up of all the workers 
on the second shift. For example, at one midwestern cement plant, 
a group of six workers from shipping approached the plant 
manager requesting a meeting to address problems in their 
department. The plant manager, believing that this new committee 
represented a breakdown in the union's approach to disputes, 
readily agreed to meet. Over the course of the next two hours, 
fifteen different groups of employees requested similar meetings. 
Through this approach, the local lodge was able to involve almost 
every worker in the plant in the dispute procedure. It took over 
three days to conduct all 15 meetings. 
In another case at a cement plant on the west coast, the 
"traditional grievance committee" met with management to 
demand that all quarry trucks and earth-moving equipment be 
given safety inspections. Management stated its belief that it wasn't 
a problem because no truck drivers or equipment operators from 
the quarry had complained. The committee then had all nine 
drivers and operators on shift leave their jobs and come to the 
plant manager's office to register their complaints. After two hours 
of meetings, the company agreed to the inspections. (As it turned 
out, one truck had brake damage and another had considerable 
metal fatigue on the spindles.) 
The union has taken the position that the size of the dispute 
committee should be based on the circumstances of the dispute. 
If management objects to the size of a committee, and they usually 
do, the union negotiates over the issue of committee size. Many 
times the union has spent several hours attempting to resolve the 
issue of committee size before ever discussing disputes on terms 
and conditions. 
In a cement plant in the Southwest, the union demanded that 
the company meet with its committee of thirteen people to discuss 
disputes. The company refused to meet at all, prompting the union 
to take further action. At the time, there were 40 to 50 workers 
on coffee break who refused to return to work until the company 
agreed to meet. After almost two hours, the company agreed to 
meet with a committee of six people and the workers returned 
to work. 
Employees at a Midwestern cement plant demanded that the 
company meet with a committee of the entire plant. The reason 
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for this meeting was the company's refusal to supply the union 
with information they had requested and which the company had 
promised to provide. After the entire plant (90 people) waited 
outside the administration building (chanting and singing 
Solidarity Forever), the company agreed to meet with a 
representative committee. The union agreed, but demanded that 
their International representative be in attendance at the meeting. 
When the representative arrived at the plant an hour later, the 
workers returned to their jobs. 
At another cement plant in the West, a solidarity committee of 
20 workers (10 on duty and 10 off) demanded that the company 
meet to discuss disputes. The company refused to meet with a 
committee of that size. The union explained that given the nature 
of the dispute this size committee was reasonable and requested 
a time and place that the company consider reasonable to meet 
with this committee. The company refused to meet, so the 
committee sat in the plant conference room for the entire eight 
hour shift waiting for the company. The next day they sat in the 
conference room again for the entire shift. At the end of the second 
day the incoming shift walked off the job and did not return to 
work until the next morning. 
At another plant the "traditional grievance committee" met with 
management to discuss safety matters. After several hours, the 
employer refused to resolve any of the issues raised by the union. 
Because a number of the safety issues were serious in nature, the 
committee asked all employees to come to the administration 
building to demand the company protect their safety and health. 
After spending one half-hour on the telephone (presumably talking 
to his attorneys), the plant manager agreed to meet with the 
committee provided workers returned to their jobs. As they had 
met for several hours, the union stated that the safety issues had 
already been discussed and that they now wanted resolution. After 
another 30 minutes, the company finally agreed to resolve the 
safety problems and the workers returned to their jobs. 
One cement company had refused to deliver emergency calls 
to employees in the plant. The next morning all the employees 
punched in and went directly to the plant manager's office. The 
workers sat outside the office for the entire shift until management 
finally agreed to institute a procedure for employees to be 
immediately informed of emergency calls. 
At a cement plant in California, the company introduced a black 
plastic substance to be burned in the cement kilns. Fearing the 
substance might be toxic, workers demanded to know the 
composition of the substance. When the plant manager stated that 
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the substance was ground battery casings, the union demanded 
documentation of this claim and stated that all workers would 
remain at the administration building until documentation was 
produced. Seven hours later, the company provided the 
documentation and workers returned to their jobs. 
The company then sent a letter to each employee stating that 
actions in the plant had created numerous safety hazards. The 
union demanded that the company provide them with a list of 
the safety hazards. When the company refused, the employees 
once again left their jobs and gathered at t h e administration 
building, demanding to know about the safety hazards in the plant. 
After workers sat and waited through four shifts of work, the 
employer finally produced a list of safety hazards and a plan to 
remedy these hazards. The workers then returned to their jobs. 
Most of the concerted activities have not necessitated the 
employees leaving the plant in order to resolve disputes. In a 
number of cases, however, the activities have led to strikes. These 
situations have generally arisen when the employer has presented 
an ultimatum to the effect that workers should return to their jobs 
or punch out. If, in such situations, the union felt that the dispute 
involved an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer, 
workers punched out and set up picket lines. Since ULP strikers 
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are protected from replacement, these disputes were usually 
resolved in a short period of time. 
When employees work with the protection of a contract, 
traditional grievance committees adequately allow the union to 
fairly represent the workers' interest. When conditions that greatly 
reduce workers' rights and benefits are unilaterally implemented 
by employers, it is necessary for the union to expand worker 
participation in resolving disputes. It is equally necessary for 
workers to act in concert in seeking equitable resolutions of 
disputes. 
Protecting Health and Safety 
In efforts to protect workers' safety and health, the union has 
relied heavily on the protection provided by the Mine Safety and 
Health Act. Cement workers are defined as "stone miners" under 
the law and as such are covered under MSHA rather than OSHA. 
Although the union has always taken a strong position with respect 
to safety and health, under the Solidarity and Unity Program the 
union has been even more vigilant. 
Cement workers were given extensive training in the basic 
provisions of MSHA and their rights under the law. Consequently, 
workers regularly insisted on basic MSHA requirements. This 
included making employers provide workers with training on all 
new jobs and perform regular inspections of all vehicles. Both of 
these actions are requirements of the Law. 
Local leaders and members were also trained extensively in 
hazard recognition and MSHA safety and health standards. 
Cement workers have vigilantly policed their workplaces and have 
overlooked no violations, even those of a minor nature. Some 
workers became more adept at recognizing hazards and violations 
of MSHA standards than some MSHA inspectors. 
At one cement plant in the South, an MSHA inspector arrived 
to perform a mandatory inspection. (MSHA requires that work 
places be inspected twice a year.) A local union representative 
accompanied the inspector (allowed under the law) and began 
pointing out violations of MSHA standards. After inspecting about 
one tenth of the plant, the union representative had pointed out 
25 violations, but the inspector was failing to cite the violations. 
The union representative confronted the inspector and demanded 
to know why he was not issuing citations. The inspector stated 
that since the violations were not serious in nature, he did not 
feel it was necessary to cite all of them. The local union 
representative informed the inspector that the law required that 
all violations, nonserious as well as serious, be cited. The inspector 
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The Legal Right To Concerted lictivity 
An important aspect of in-plant strategies is the use of legal rights 
guaranteed to all employees by the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) and by safety and health legislation. Exercise of these rights 
is dependent on a number of factors, however, and the extent of 
legal protection afforded is subject to interpretation—eventually by 
the Reagan-appointed NLRB. 
One of the most important legal protections is provided by Section 
7 of the NLRA, which grants employees the right to engage in 
concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection. Not all 
concerted activity falls within the rights guaranteed by Section 7, 
however. In addition to being "concerted," employees' acts must 
also be "protected1/ which generally means that they must have 
both a legal objective and a legal means of achieving it. For more 
information on "protected concerted activities," consult with your 
union's legal department. 
Section 8(d) of the NLRA requires the employer to bargain with 
the representative of his employees over wages, hours, terms and 
conditions of employment. Although bargaining over a new contract 
may have reached impasse and the emloyer may have implemented 
his final offer, the employer cannot make subsequent unilateral 
changes without again bargaining to impasse with the employees' 
representative. The employer has a duty to bargain over issues that 
may formerly have been handled in a grievance process, but there 
are limitations on the time, place and subjects of bargaining. Check 
with legal counsel on the extent of the employer's duty to bargain 
in specific situations. 
The NLRA also proscribes certain types of employer behavior 
as unfair labor practices (ULPs). ULPs include any interference with 
employees' exercise of rights under the Act, surveillence, intimida-
tion, discrimination against employees because of their union 
activities, bad faith bargaining, surface bargaining. If an employer 
engages in any of these practices, workers can call an unfair labor 
practice strike. Unlike employees who strike over economic issues, 
ULP strikers cannot be permanently replaced. 
Employees can also take advantage of safety and health legisla-
tion that protects their right to refuse unsafe work. The amount 
of protection available varies greatly with the type of workplace, 
the legislation covering that workplace, and the particular circum-
stances involved. It is important to know the full extent of your 
protections before refusing work. 
Reliance on legal rights requires consultation with attorneys. Talk 
with your union's legal counsel before engaging in any of these 
activities. 
Elaine Charpentier, MCLR staff attorney 
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said he would have to confer with his Area Director. The union 
representative also called the Area Director and demanded that 
the MSHA inspector perform his job as specified under the Law. 
The next morning the Area Director and the inspector arrived 
at the plant and began the inspection anew. At the completion 
of the inspection, the 25 violations raised by the union 
representative were cited as well as approximately 100 additional 
violations, some of a serious nature. It should be noted that under 
MSHA, as opposed to OSHA, all violations (serious and 
nonserious) carry monetary penalties. 
As the Solidarity and Unity Program has grown, it has taken 
a greater toll on the mental health of managers than it has on 
workers. The need to act in concert built a strong unity among 
workers and brought a sense of cause to their struggle, but the 
Solidarity and Unity Program tends to create divisiveness among 
managers. The protracted and unpredictable nature of the 
Solidarity and Unity Program resulted in insecurity and general 
uneasiness for managers, particularly front-line foremen. 
Sometimes this insecurity bordered on paranoia, and foremen 
would react to imaginary problems. 
At one Midwestern plant, a supervisor accused a bulldozer 
operator of engaging in a slowdown on the job because he kept 
shifting to a lower gear as he moved stone in the quarry. The 
operator explained that he kept slowing down because there was 
a slight incline in a section of the quarry floor. The supervisor 
ordered the operator to keep the dozer at a steady speed. The 
operator further explained that to do so might possibly result in 
damage to the bulldozer's undercarriage. The supervisor reiterated 
his charge that the worker was merely engaging in a slowdown, 
and again ordered him to keep the dozer in high gear. After bracing 
himself, the worker drove the bulldozer over the incline in high 
gear. As a result of the higher speed, four bearings were knocked 
out of the bulldozer. At $1,500 per bearing, it was an expensive 
lesson for the supervisor to learn: that the operator knew what 
he was talking about. 
Unfair Labor Practice Strikes 
Part of the Solidarity and Unity Program involves conducting 
unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes. Because workers are protected 
from replacement when conducting an ULP strike, the employers 
cannot use the strike to bust the union. There have been several 
ULP strikes over the issue of employers' refusal to meet on 
disputes involving hours, wages and other terms and conditions 
of employment. Generally, these ULP strikes have been of short 
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CONCLUSION 
The Solidarity and Unity Program has been in effect for over 
a year. More than 8,000 cement workers in more than 50 cement 
plants throughout the country have worked without a contract 
since May 1, 1984. During that period, there have been a few 
victories attributable to the Solidarity and Unity Program. In 
August of 1984, the Blue Circle Cement Company settled on a 
contract almost identical to the pattern settlement with Lone Star 
Cement. This settlement came about in part because of the union's 
threat to initiate the Solidarity and Unity Program. In 1985, the 
Giant Cement Company settled with the union after the Solidarity 
and Unity Program was in effect at the plant for six months. The 
other cement companies, almost 70% of the industry, have stood 
fast with their implemented final offers. Cement workers have 
been equally unrelenting in their resistence to those final offers. 
The union is winning in its struggle if only because the Solidarity 
Program provides a tangible way to continue fighting. The 
commitment that cement workers have to their struggle is stronger 
than ever. The protracted nature of the struggle has benefited the 
union. As the Solidarity Program has grown, so has the level of 
organization in the local lodges. Unlike protracted strikes which 
tend to erode worker discipline and organization, the Solidarity 
and Unity Program has strengthened these critical elements. 
Workers using an in-plant strategy do not feel the same financial 
pressures as strikers. The cement membership has made it very 
clear that their struggle will not be over until they have all cement 
companies under a standardized agreement. The preservation of 
the cement workers' historical bargaining strength—pattern 
bargaining—has become the fundamental issue in this struggle. 
The Solidarity and Unity Program has taken its toll on the 
cement industry. First of all, it enabled the union to define both 
the tactics and the battleground for struggle. The companies had 
anticipated the union striking and had developed a program to 
use the strike to bust the union. The companies' high-priced 
consultants and union-busting attorneys never anticipated that the 
workers would stay in the plants and resist. The concerted 
activities of the Solidarity Program have kept the attorneys' meters 
running. The unpredictability of the in-plant tactics have also had 
a definite effect on the psychology of cement managers. In many 
plants, first-line foremen secretly side with the workers. Most 
foremen realize that if the employer is successful in gutting the 
workers' contract, their own wages and benefits will also be 
vulnerable. 
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The long-term effects of the SoUdarity and Unity Program will 
be beneficial to the union and detrimental to the companies. The 
program has greatly strengthened local unions. An aware, 
organized and committed membership will be increasingly vigilant 
about protecting their interests in the future. The heightened level 
of awareness and organization undoubtedly benefits the union's 
broader agenda, most notably in the political arena. 
The Solidarity and" Unity Program is an answer to the growing 
failure of the strike strategy. It is a strategy that recognizes the 
importance of bringing economic pressure on the employer. The 
in-plant strategy does not preclude other pressure strategies the 
labor movement has developed. As a matter of fact, in conjunction 
with the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO, the 
Boilermakers have been conducting a corporate campaign against 
Ideal Cement, the fourth largest producer. Also with the assistance 
of the Industrial Union Department the International has held 
meetings with European Cement Workers' Unions to solicit 
support for the struggle. 
The difference between the in-plant strategy and other 
alternative strategies is that it relies on the labor movement's 
traditional principles and strengths. The basic trade union 
principles of unity, solidarity and collective action are the 
cornerstones of the SoUdarity and Unity Program. These are the 
same principles that unions have applied for years in waging 
strikes. The in-plant strategy can be appUed in almost every work 
situation. The key elements to the strategy's success are that all 
levels of the union be committed to the struggle, know their legal 
rights, and not fear confronting the employer. When the cement 
workers were shown a concrete and viable strategy to combat 
management's attacks, they embraced it with solidarity and 
determination. 
As other local lodges have drawn inspiration from the struggle 
of their brothers and sisters in the cement industry, the 
commitment to the in-plant strategy has grown throughout the 
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers. The leadership of the 
Brotherhood has realized that bold action must be taken to combat 
the harsh political and economic conditions faced by today's 
workers. They have begun initiating SoUdarity and Unity Programs 
in plants and industries throughout the union. The cement 
workers' struggle has convinced the Brotherhood that an in-plant 
strategy is a viable method for building strong local unions and 
combatting concession bargaining and union busting. • 
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UE 610 Finds Another Way to Beat WABCO 
UE Local 610 attracted a lot of attention in 1982 when in 
the teeth of the worst recession since the 1930s and as the 
first wave of concessions contracts was reaching its crest, 
it endured a six-month strike to beat concessions at 
Westinghouse Airbrake Co. (WABCO) in the Pittsburgh area. 
Three years after the strike, however, the local was still 
scarred by its ordeal. With savings accounts depleted and 
with fresh memories of the strains involved in a long strike, 
members were in no mood to go at it again. WABCO and 
its companion plant, Union Switch & Signal, are among the 
few manufacturing facilities providing steady work in the 
area, and there are plenty of skilled and unskilled workers 
around who haven't had much work in the past few years. 
The company came at the union with a full array of 
concessions demands—including a $1.70-an-hour wage cut— 
and then at the last minute dropped off most of those 
demands and went for a straight wage freeze and the 
elimination of COLA. The company knew the membership 
was divided and weak, and was banking on its "final offer" 
seeming moderate against the background of its initial 
demands. 
Local leadership recommended rejection of the contract 
and in one Sunday afternoon membership meeting explained 
the basic concept of "in-plant strategies." The idea caught 
on among the membership and spread spontaneously 
beginning with the Monday morning shift. The ban on 
overtime was complete, and management was thrown off 
guard. By the third week, production had been cut "by at 
least half," and the company agreed to a no-concessions 
contract with a modest boost in wages. 
According to union leaders, the local is "more together" 
now than at any time since the 1982 strike. Unfortunately 
in July WABCO announced it is shutting down part of one 
plant, eUminating 1,200 of the local's 2,300 members—a 
subject which never came up in negotiations. The fight has 
now moved to different terrain, as the local mobilizes to 
contest the shutdown, looking for another way to "stay in." 
